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Abstract 
This study sought to investigate the link between private investment decisions and various governance 
institutions. This link is empirically tested for a panel of 4 East Africa countries by estimating a random effect 
model for the period 1996-2015. While the literature has placed special emphasis on the role of corruption on 
private investments, we explore a wider range of institutional aspects. Estimations results show that government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, control of corruption, and rule of law influence the level of private investments.  
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1. Introduction 
Private investment enhances the production capacity of an economy, which leads to transfer of new technology 
as well as government revenue. The level of private investment determines the rate of economic growth.  It is 
positively related to expansion of GDP therefore, key to long term growth of a country (King’wara, 2014; 
Mlambo and Oshikoya, 2001).  It may also boost public investment as demand for public services that support 
private sector investment increases.   
The main objective of this study is to investigate the role of institutions on private investment. The 
East Africa Community (EAC) Treaty has identifies improvement of investment climate as key area of co-
operation with the aim of achieving balanced and sustainable economic development within its members states. 
Thus, private investments have been prioritized as key area that requires much attention if the East African 
economies were to achieve the much needed economic development. This culminated in the adoption of 
industrialization policy in the Heads of State summit held on 2011. The policy aimed at promoting value 
addition and diversification of product based on comparative advantages of the EAC region.  
EAC countries have also undertaken various economic reforms (see Ronge & Kimuyu, 1997; Were et 
al., 2006) since the introduction of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in early 1980s and liberalization of 
economies 1990s. These include institution, legal, and regulatory reforms that has enabled private participation 
in service and good delivery, for example, Privatization and Public Investment Act 1996 in Rwanda, and Public 
Enterprise Reform and Divestiture Statute Act 1993 in Uganda. Several statutory authorities have also been 
established as vehicles to promote and protect the interest of private investors. These include Kenya Private 
Sector Alliance (KEPSA), the Private Sector Foundation of Uganda (PSFU) and Tanzania Private Sector 
Foundation (TPSF). 
That notwithstanding, private investments to GDP ratio has remained not only low but also volatile 
(see Figure 1). In Kenya, the lowest percentage recorded being 7.5% (2000) and the highest 16.2% (2005), while 
in Rwanda 5.1% (1996) and 12.6% (2008), in Uganda 11.3% (1998) and 21.4% (2013) in Burundi -27% (1999) 
and 15.1% (2013). Since the year 2005 Uganda has demonstrated a consistent upward trajectory on the level of 
private investments while Kenya has performed dismally. This study therefore sought to address the following 
research question. Could there be other factors besides the traditional determinants of private investments such 
as quality of institutions that explained the observed disparity?  
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Figure 1: The trend of private investment in EAC 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (various years). Tanzania is not included due to missing data  
Good institutions reduce uncertainty, and cost of doing business. It creates conducive environment for 
business prosperity through improved government performance as well as policy predictability which are key 
ingredients for productive ventures (World Bank, 2004). According to World Economic Forum
1
 (2015), legal 
and institutions framework within which economic agents interact; determine the competitiveness, influences 
decisions whether to or not to invest and how benefits/costs associated with development strategies and policies 
are distributed in an economy. These emphasize the need to prioritize institutions reforms given its vital role in 
an economy. In fact, weak institutions remain one of the major challenges affecting not only East Africa 
countries but also Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole (World Economic Forum, 2015). 
Several studies have investigated determinants of private investments. Kalu, Tendai and Sheshangai 
(2010) investigated how the legal environment and finance affect manufacturing firms’ decision to invest in East 
Africa. A firm investment decision making function was estimated with confidence in judicially, unofficial 
payment, loan, growth in firms’ revenue as well as country dummy as explanatory variable. The study found that 
right to property ownership is the key channel through which quality legal system translates to more investment. 
This is consistent with Knack and Kneefer (1995) who found that contract enforceability and risk of 
expropriation play a great role in determining investment more than any other governance institutions. These 
studies however, concentrated only on the two governance institutions namely corruption and rule of law.  
In a cross country analysis, Asiedu and Freeman (2009) examined the effect of corruption on growth of 
firm’s investment levels by employing ordinary least squares (OLS) and iteratively reweighted least squares 
(IRLS) procedures on investment data collected from 10,032 firms in 81 countries for the period 1995-1998. The 
study found that corruption affect firm’s investments growth differently across regions. For example, corruption 
is statistically significant with a negative sign on growth of investment for firms in the Transition economies but 
not statistically significant for firms in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and Latin America.  
The study by Pastor and Sung (1995) is among the few to show a link between the various institutions 
of democracy and private investment levels in the developing countries. Their study employed ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimation method and time series cross-sectional data from a sample of fifteen (15) countries 
between 1973 and 1986 to estimate the impact of the various democratic institutions on fixed capital formation. 
The study found that improved democratic institutions such political participation, recruitment process, openness 
in government operation, political continuity, attitude toward foreign investor’s leads to higher levels of private 
investment.   
Le (2004) examined economic and political determinant of private investment by employing Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) procedure for a sample of 25 developing economies for the period 1975 to 
1995. The study found that constitutional government changes and nonviolent protest enhances private 
investment while unconstitutional government changes, violent protest and frequency changes of policy makers 
hampers private investment. This study too failed to capture the role of an array of governance institutions. 
Several studies have investigated the determinants of private investments on specific African 
economies. They include King’ori (2015) and King’wara (2014) on Kenya, Ulrich (2010) on Benin, Asante 
(2000) on Ghana and Kazeem et al. (2012) on Nigeria. These studies however fail to control for the quality of 
institutions.  
                                                 
1 https://www.weforum.org/ 
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At the global level, available literature on the role of institutions on private investment has mainly 
focused on the security of property rights (see North, 1990; Easterly & Lavine, 2003; Kalu et al, 2010) while a 
few have addressed political instability, corruption, and government effectiveness (see Keefer 2002; Rodrik, 
1991; Alesina & Perolti, 1996).  
Interestingly, neither of these studies attempted to categorize which institutions were least or most 
likely to influence firm’s decisions to invest. These initial findings suggest that rule of law and in particular, the 
security of property rights, political instabilities, control of corruption and government effectiveness, democratic 
institutions such political participation, recruitment process, openness in government operation, political 
continuity, attitude toward foreign investor’s etc. would result to higher levels of private investment. 
Unconstitutional government changes, violent protest and frequency changes of policy makers’ hamper private 
investment as well. 
This study makes at least three main contributions to existing literature on institutions economics. First, 
it is timely, in view of the current emphasis on the role of private sector in economic growth, which remains a 
top priority in the reform agendas of African countries. Second, this study broadens the dimension beyond the 
traditional institutional indicators. There exists only a rudimentary understanding to what degree institutions 
actually matter particularly in EAC. Rigorous analysis for EAC is often impeded by the lack of appropriate data. 
Third, at the policy level, examining institutional factors that influence private investment will help the 
policymakers gain better insights in order to prioritize economic reforms surrounding the various institutions of 
governance in their effort to address the problem of low investment in the region. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes theoretical framework, empirical specifications, 
econometric approach, data and the measurements of our variables of interest.  In section 3 we present the 
empirical results and discussions. Conclusions and policy suggestions are offered in the final section by pointing 
out some unresolved issues. 
 
2. Methodology 
2.1 Theoretical framework 
Given the long term nature of investment, private investors need an assurance that rule of law will prevail and 
the right to property ownership will be protected and respected by the government in power. They also require 
that dispute be resolved expeditiously, fairly and amicably. Slow dispute resolution leads to high litigation cost 
which in turn impact negatively to the transaction cost of the firm. These costs are later transferred to consumers 
through higher prices. High prices may lead to a reduction in sales causing firms to shut down their operations 
and preventing new investments in an economy.  
This study employed the neoclassical flexible accelerator model which is widely used in the literature. 
The model assumes firms invest today to earn higher profits in the future (Jorgenson 1967). Flexible accelerator 
is therefore a firm’s profit maximization problem. It posits that net investment is step by step change in the 
actual capital stock to its desired level. Investment in this model is determined by expected aggregate demand or 
the accelerator, the wage rate, the user cost of capital and the initial capital stock. The task therefore for this 
study is to derive a standard accelerator investment function and then thereafter includes other variables that 
capture institutional characteristics in the EAC context. 
In the accelerator theory, investment is a function of output growth. It is therefore a difference between 
capital stock in two different time period. The desired capital stock a function of output   is assumed 
to be proportional to output at any given time. Thus; 
………………………………………………………………………………… (1) 
Where,  is the desired capital stock at time t,  is the adjustment coefficient and  is the level of output at time 
t. 
Differentiating equation (1) with respect to time t, it becomes, 
………………………………………………………………………………. (2) 
Where and  represent change in capital stock and output levels at time t respectively.  
To derive a relationship between capital stock and the levels of investment, a capital accumulation identity 
function is specified as;  
 …………………………………………………………………… (3) 
Where  represent depreciation coefficient,  is capital stock at time t-1 and  gross investment at time t 
From equation (3),  
 ………………………………………………………………… (4) 
Rearranging equation (4) and assuming zero depreciation ( ), an investment identity function is derived as 
follows; 
 …………………………………………………………………………………. (5) 
Substituting equation (5) into equation (2), we obtain a basic investment function specified as 
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 ……………………………………………………………………………......... (6) 
Investment therefore depends on the growth of output. The final gross investment model therefore becomes;
 ……………………………………………………................… (8) 
Where  captures the effect of variables such as structural reform, governance institutions, macroeconomic and 
policy related factors that are unique to developing countries.  
 
2.2 Model specification 
From the theoretical considerations, equation (8) can take the following form,  
……………..................………….. (9)  
The net investment in the neoclassical flexible model is determined by the expected aggregate demand or 
accelerator and the user cost of capital. The private investment equation is therefore augmented to include 
previous year GDP growth rate, institutions (INST) and interest rate (INT) to control for the accelerator effect 
and that of user cost of capital respectively. For the purpose of estimation, a general linear model is specified as;  
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Where ctPI is the private investment to GDP ratio in country c, at time t, with t=1, . . ., T; α is the 
regression constant, 
n
ctC  is a vector of institutions quality indicators (n) (namely control of corruption (COR), 
government effectiveness (GE), rule of law (RL), regulatory quality (REG), voice and public accountability 
(VA), political stability and absence of violence (PS)) in country c during the period t;
m
ctC is a vector of country-
specific control variables (m) in country c (namely real interest rate (INT),  trade openness (OPEN),  domestic 
credit as percentage of GDP (DCREDT) and previous year real gross domestic product (GDP)) during the period 
t; D denotes the country-specific dummy variables and tcittc muge ++= is the disturbance, with iu  the 
unobserved effect,  tcm is the idiosyncratic error and tg is the unobservable time effects. db , are the 
coefficients to be estimated.  
 
2.3 Definition and measurement of variables 
Private investment is the dependent variable measured as the ratio of private investment to GDP. This ratio has 
been fluctuating in EAC despite various government efforts, such enactment of Public Private Partnership Act, 
Privatization Act, creation of  Investment Authorities amongst other bodies and policies, aimed at promoting 
and/or creating a conduce environment for private sector investments.   
Voice and accountability (VA) captures the extent to which citizens get involved in activities of their 
government, right of individual/organization, political process, right to associate, and the freedom of the media 
so as to hold politicians accountable for their action. Transparency in government operations reduces level of 
corruption (COR) in a country. It also ensures politicians are accountable to their action reducing chances of 
making unilateral decision which could be harmful to investment. More so, participation of economic agent in 
country decision making improves service delivery as well as the quality of government policies. Voice and 
accountability was therefore predicted to have a positive relationship with private investment.   
Political stability and absence of violence (PS) captures investment risk triggered by the authority in 
power. Illegal changes in governments affect the continuity of policies, as well as undermining the right of 
citizens to freely select and replace those in power. Political instabilities therefore increase policy uncertainties 
thereby discouraging fixed capital investment. Investors may avoid long term investments in regions where there 
is a possibility of conflict or ethnic tension for fear of property damage. We therefore predict a positive 
relationship between political stability (PS) and private investments. 
Government effectiveness (GE) captures the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence and 
independence of the civil service from political pressures, and government’s commitment to its policies. A 
country with competent and strong bureaucracy operates with minimal or no drastic changes in policy or 
interruptions in the provision of government services. The bureaucracy tends to be somewhat independent of 
political pressure and has an established clear mechanism for hiring and training. The effectiveness of 
government improves the quality of regulations. We therefore predict a positive relationship between 
effectiveness of government and private investment  
Regulatory quality (REG) measures absence of market-unfriendly policies such as inadequate bank 
supervision or price controls in an economy. Overregulation creates unnecessary burden to new entrants in a 
market. New firms have to seek the services of local experienced brokers to take them through the registration 
process and this raises the cost of entry in a market. Small firms are forced to operate informally making it 
difficult for them to access credit facilities which is necessary for growth. We therefore predict a positive 
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relationship between regulatory quality (REG) and private investment. 
Rule of law (RL) is a proxy for the degree in which citizens have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of their country. Its impact on private investment vest on ability of judiciary to make fair and timely decision as 
well as the government respect for property rights. Firms with secure property rights easily attract external 
finance thereby enhancing their decisions to invest in a country (Kalu et al, 2010). We therefore predict a 
positive relationship between enforcement of the rule of law and private investment.  
Corruption (COR) is the exercise/use of public office for private gain. The corrupter make extra payments to a 
public official to get things done. Public official demand to be paid to offer government services and/ or 
influence tendering process in supply of public good or services. High levels of corruption increases political 
instability which in turn reduces the level of human capital formation and discouraging private investment in an 
economy (Mo, 2001).  It may also lead to rising levels of income inequality (Gupta et al, 2002) which may in 
turn lead to violent protest. Corruption lead to high cost of doing business as well as operation cost as firms have 
to pay bribes to get government approvals. It can lead to distortion of policy and weaken the credibility of 
government. We therefore predict that effective fight against corruption would have a positive influence on 
private investment.  
Control variables 
GDP  
Real GDP was included as independent variable to control for the effect of aggregate demand (accelerator) in the 
neoclassical flexible accelerator model. The model affirms that real GDP growth rate affect investment 
positively. Kazeem et al. (2012) also found that real GDP determines private investment in both the short run 
and long run period.  Real GDP therefore was anticipated to have a positive effect on investment.  
Interest rate  
Rising interest rates increases the cost of borrowing which in turn discourages investment. King’wara (2014) 
found that real interest rate had negative relationship with private investments. We therefore predict a negative 
impact on private investment. 
Domestic credit 
Domestic credit measured as ratio of private sector credit to GDP is the financial resources such as loans 
extended to the private investors by bank and other depository institutions which establish a claim for repayment. 
Access to private credit enhances private investment. Ferreira et al, (2013) found that reduction in the credits 
volume hinders private investment. Thus availability of domestic credit should have a positive effect on 
investment  
Trade openness 
The openness of economy is the sum of exports and imports as ratio of GDP (Frankel and Romer, 1999).  Trade 
openness exposes local industries from external competition which sometimes Infant local industries may not 
withstand. This implies trade openness has negative relationship with private investment (King’ori, 2015). On 
the other hand, trade openness expands the market and availability of cheap raw materials for manufacturing 
firms. In this case, trade openness is expected to have a positive relationship with private investment (Adel, 
2015). The expected effect is therefore ambiguous.  
Inflation  
High cost of inputs as well as prices translates to low saving by citizen since a large proportion of their income 
goes to consumption. Less saving implies low investment. We therefore predict inflation would have negative 
effect on private investment. 
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Table 1: Summary of variables and measurements 
Variable Measure  Expected effect Data Source 
Private Investment 
(PI) 
Gross fixed capital formation, private sector as 
ratio of GDP 
 WDI 
Voice and Public 
Accountability(VA) 
Measures the degree of  Political Rights and Civil 
Liberties  
Positive WGI- 
World Bank 
 
Political Stability 
(PS)  
The likelihood of  conflict and/or illegal changes 
in government  
Positive 
Government 
Effectiveness (GE) 
Measures the quality of  government structures 
and the competence of civil service  
Positive 
 Regulatory Quality 
(REG) 
  
measures occurrence of market-unfriendly 
policies such as inadequate bank supervision or 
price controls in an economy 
Positive 
Control of 
Corruption (COR) 
Measures the incidence of use of public offices for 
personal gain.  
 Positive 
Rule of Law (RL) Measures the incidences of crime, non-
compliance with courts directives and 
enforcement of property rights  
Positive 
Real Gross Domestic 
Product (RGDP)  
Annual growth on Gross Domestic Product  Positive World 
Developmen
t Indicators 
Real Interest Rate 
(RIR) 
The lending rate exclusive of inflation.  Negative  
Domestic Credit 
(DCREDIT) 
Total amount of credit borrowed by the private 
sector as ratio of GDP  
Positive 
Inflation Rate (INFL) Measured by annual growth rate of the GDP 
implicit deflator. 
Negative 
 Trade Openness 
(OPEN)  
Sum of exports and imports as ratio of GDP Indeterminate 
 
2.4 Econometric approach 
To examine the impact of institutions on private investment, and for the purpose of estimation and testing we 
proceeded as follows. First, we test for non-stationarity using the Fisher test. Based on the p-values of individual 
unit root tests, Fisher's test assumes that all series are non-stationary under the null hypothesis against the 
alternative that at least one series in the panel is stationary. Depending on the outcome of the panel unit root test, 
we estimate the model excluding the non-stationary variables, especially if the excluded variables do not affect 
the model’s performance 
The second issue we have to address is the choice between a Fixed Effect (FE) and a Random Effect 
model (RE). For the purpose of estimation, we apply the least squares methods of FE and RE models. Under a 
FE model the vi’s are considered fixed parameters to be estimated. FE model transforms the estimating equation 
so as to get rid of the fixed effects (Baltagi, 2013). Under a RE model the vi’s are assumed to be random and the 
estimation method is generalized least squares (GLS). We perform the traditional Hausman test where we first 
estimate the fixed effects model, save the coefficients and compare them with the results of the random affects 
model. In the event that we obtain Hausman test value which is larger than the critical chi-square, then the FE 
estimator is the appropriate choice. 
The regressions were performed by utilizing an unbalanced panel data. The Breusch–Pagan test was 
undertaken to test the presence of heteroskedasticity in the residual variance before regressing equation (10). A 
Langrage multiplier statistic was calculated and compared with the critical chi-square value X
2
. Further the 
Eicker-Huber-White standard error was used to control heteroskedasticity in order to obtain homoskedastic 
estimates.  
 
2.5 Sources of data 
This study used panel data covering the period 1996-2015 for four EAC economies. Data on private investment 
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(endogenous variable) and trade openness, inflation rate, real GDP, real interest rates, as well as domestic credit 
were obtained from World Development Indicators (WDI).  
Data on the various institutions indicators were accessed at www.govindicators.org and as defined by 
Kaufmann et al., (2003). The dataset contains a summary of opinion on the quality of the six institutions of 
governance gathered from different stakeholders such locals, business community and various experts across 
different economies. The unit used to measure these governance institutions was obtained by aggregating several 
indicators collected from 30 different sources.  
 
3. Empirical results and discussions 
3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
A descriptive statistics test was conducted before subjecting the data to a regression analysis. The mean values as 
indicated by Table 2 shows that East Africa countries performed well in terms of regulatory quality (35.43%) 
compared with political stability and absence of violence index which had the least improvement (14.96%). The 
data for regulatory quality and government effectiveness is negatively skewed. This means that the four East 
African countries performance was above average in relations to the two institution variables over the study 
period. 
Table 2: Summary statistics  
Variable Notation Obs Mean Median Std.dev Max Min Skewness 
Private investment PI 78  0.0927 0.0950 0.0837 0.2141 -0.2701 -2.1417 
Real Interest Rate INT 77  0.0900 0.0945 0.0844 0.2866 -0.1668 -0.3408 
Domestic Credit DCREDT 70  0.1647 0.1488 0.0767 0.3489 0.0483 0.5531 
Trade Openness OPEN 80  0.4246 0.4355 0.1052 0.6449 0.2096 -0.2022 
Real GDP RGDP 80  0.0526 0.0514 0.0363 0.1385 -0.0800 -0.5175 
Inflation Rate INFL 80  0.0945 0.0806 0.0881 0.4199 -0.0919 1.3711 
Voice and 
Accountability 
VA 
68  
0.2397 0.2279 0.1144 0.4375 0.0385 0.0492 
Regulatory Quality REG 68  0.3543 0.4320 0.1695 0.6154 0.0441 -0.4340 
Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence 
PS 
68  
0.1496 0.1280 0.1071 0.4429 0.0048 1.2042 
Rule of Law RL 68  0.2582 0.2201 0.1498 0.6106 0.0239 0.3546 
Government 
Effectiveness 
GE 
68  
0.3034 0.3390 0.1515 0.5735 0.0293 -0.2358 
Control of Corruption COR 68  0.2464 0.1855 0.1941 0.7692 0.0142 1.5868 
 
3.2 Correlation analysis 
Table 3 indicates that the correlation between domestic credit and voice and accountability is strong and 
significant implying that increased transparency and openness improve firm access to investment credit through 
increased access to information on availability of credit facilities. There also exist significant negative 
correlation between interest rate and inflation therefore the two variables may not be included in the same model 
to avoid spurious result.  
Our institution variables also show positive correlations with levels of private investment. This is 
consistent with the existing literature on quality of institutions. World Bank (2005) considered respect for 
property rights as central to economic growth.  Good institutions reduce uncertainty, and cost of doing business. 
It enhances the government performance as well as policy predictability which are key ingredients for productive 
capacity (World Bank, 2004).  
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Table 3: Correlation matrix 
 
Correlation between rule of law and regulatory quality is strong and significant. This perhaps indicates 
that clear business process, government policies as well as an ambiguous legal framework contributes effectively 
to the general observance of laws and facilitates fair judgments. We also observe high correlation between 
government effectiveness and regulatory quality which implies that the effectiveness of government improves 
the quality of regulations as demonstrated in section 2.3. The result also shows that government effectiveness is 
significantly correlated with both the regulatory quality and rule of law. This indicates that competent public 
officers which are free from political interference enhance the quality and predictability of government policies 
which would in turn facilitate speedy and fair disputes resolution. 
Our regression analysis enables us to analyze how the various types of institutions are related with 
private investment in East Africa while controlling for other determinants of private investments. Due to the high 
correlation amongst our institutions variables, and some control variables, we therefore estimated four different 
sets of equations. 
 
3.3 Stationarity test 
The unit root test was conducted using the Augmented Dickey Fuller test and the results presented in Table 4. 
Unit root testing is used to test for stationarity of time series data and p-values observed. Our test show that all 
the p values are significant at 5% significance level hence we reject the null hypothesis that all the panels contain 
unit root. 
Table 4: Panel unit root test 
 Statistics p-value 
Inverse chi-squared (8) P 25.1778 0.0015 
Inverse normal Z -3.3537 0.0004 
Inverse logit t(24) L* -3.4740 0.0010 
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 4.2945 0.0000 
P statistics requires number of panels to be finite. 
Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
 
3.4 Hausman test 
The Hausman test was undertaken to determine the most appropriate model to use between the random (RE)and 
fixed effects (FE) model. Table 5 shows that there is no significant difference between the resultant coefficient 
of the two models. For, p values less than 0.05 the null hypothesis is rejected and therefore random effect model 
was adopted.   
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development                                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online) 
Vol.8, No.6, 2017 
 
26 
Table 5: Hausman test results    
Variable  Fixed (b) Random (B) Difference (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) S.E 
INT 0.1693                      0.1603 0.090 - 
DCREDT -0.3492 -0.6472 0.2979 0.1801 
OPEN 0.3481 0.2675 0.0806 0.0348 
RGDP 0.0244 0.0373 -0.0129 0.0285 
VA 0.1973 0.2212 -0.0239 0.0532 
REG 0.1655 0.0156 0.1498 0.0681 
PS -0.0324 -0.0340 0.0014 0.0450 
RL 0.1921 0.3042 -0.1121 0.1017 
GE 0.0736 -0.0129 0.0864 0.0468 
COR -0.2822 -0.2671 -0.0150 0.0576 
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
        chi2(10) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)= 5.35 
        Prob>chi2 = 0.8663 
 
3.5 Empirical results 
Table 6 reports the results from equation (10). The estimated model fits the panel data reasonably well, having 
fairly stable coefficients among the alternative models, while the Wald-test indicates fine goodness of fit since 
the overall test statistic shows rejection of the hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to zero. The overall 
explanatory power (measured by adjusted R
2
) for all models is relatively high, and is not associated with high 
correlation among some of the trended variables (e.g. INF and INT). Our results show that institutional factors 
are robust to the inclusion of additional control variables, which adds little to the explanatory power of the 
regression. Interesting results appear in both significant and non-significant findings. Based on the outcome of 
the correlation matrix, four regressions were estimated using random effect model. We comment on all 
regressions together. 
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Table 6: Estimation Results Using Random Effects-within  
Variant model specifications with robust standard errors 
Variable Notation 1 2 3 4 
Real Interest Rate INT 0.1594**   
(0.0689) 
0.0853 
(0.0695) 
0.1675*** 
(0.0682) 
0.1265** 
(0.0604) 
Domestic Credit DCREDT -0.5104***   
(0.1027) 
 -0.5630*** 
(0.1056) 
-0.4382*** 
(0.0908) 
Trade openness OPEN 0.3424*** 
(0.0955) 
0.1463 
(0.0977) 
0.3669*** 
(0.0942) 
0.3577*** 
(0.0823) 
Real GDP RGDP 0.2811 
(0.2163) 
0.5055*** 
(0.1937) 
0.2349 
(0.2173) 
0.1419 
(0.1915) 
Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence 
PS 0.2018) 
(0.1440) 
0.1632 
(0.1303) 
0.1434 
(0.1524) 
-0.0021 
(0.1366) 
Regulatory Quality REG 0.1033***   
(.0407) 
   
Control of Corruption COR 0.2113** 
(0.0938) 
-0.2024*** 
(0.0720) 
-0.2465*** 
(0.0969) 
0.1715** 
(0.0810) 
Voice and Accountability VA  -0.0689 
(0.0723) 
  
Government Effectiveness GE   0.1523*** 
(0.0601) 
 
Rule of Law RL  0.2425*** 
(0.0623) 
 0.2456*** 
(0.0509) 
constant CONS -0.0049 
(0.0333) 
-0.0120 
(0.0329) 
-0.0120 
(0.0329) 
-0.0186 
(0.0290) 
Observation Obs 56 64 56 56 
Wald chi2  106.65 94.62 106.63 154.39 
R squared  within  = 
0.4792 
within = 
0.4153 
within = 
0.4814 
within = 0.6002 
between = 
0.9797 
between = 
0.9421 
between = 
0.9812 
between = 0.9931 
overall = 
0.6896 
overall = 
0.6282 
overall = 
0.6896 
overall = 0.7628 
Table 6 represents regression results of the impact of institution on private investment in East Africa. 
Four regressions were run based on correlation analysis result using random effect model. The t-statistics are in 
parentheses while *, **, *** represents the significant levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Estimation results shows that rule of law has a positive and significant effect on private investments. 
This implies that prompts resolutions of disputes, fairly and amicably may in turn reduce litigation cost. Kalu et 
al (2010) also found that property rights, external and internal finance are the key channels through which 
quality legal system translate to more investment. Our finding is also consistent with Knack and Kneefer (1995) 
who found that contract enforceability and risk of expropriation play a great role in determining investment and 
economic growth more than any other governance institutions.  
We also established a positive and significant effect of corruption control on private investment.  As 
pointed out by World Bank (2005), corruption is major challenge to firm intending to invest in developing 
countries. Indeed the African Development Bank (2003) shows that corruption, is one of the key challenges that 
hinder private investment in Kenya. Corruption increases the overall costs of public agencies hence negatively 
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impacting on growth of private sector through provision of not only insufficient infrastructure but also of low 
quality. Hence, the ability of the government to control the levels of corruption in country is crucial for private 
sector development. Our finding is consistent with Mo (2001). On the contrary, Asiedu and Freeman (2009) 
found corruption not statistically significant for firms in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and Latin America.  
Our findings show a positive and strong relationship between regulatory quality and levels of private 
investment in EAC. Improvement in quality of regulations reduces the complexity and cost of regulatory 
processes paving way for new entrant in a market (World Bank, 2015). Generally, overregulation forces new 
firms to seek the services of local experienced brokers to take them through the registration process. This raises 
the cost of entry in a market. Small firm are therefore forced to operate informally making it difficult for them to 
access credit facilities which is necessary for growth. 
This study finds a positive relationship between government effectiveness and levels of private 
investments. This implies that a competitive process for recruiting public officers and an independent 
bureaucratic free from political interference enhances private investment growth. The finding supports Evans 
and Rauch (2000) who established that the states departments that recruit competitively and has a clear career 
progression are associated with higher levels of economic growth rate. Our finding is also consistent with the 
work of Pastor and Sung (1995) that found a positive relationship between improved democratic institutions such 
political participation, recruitment process, openness in government operation, with levels of private investment.   
Contrary to Ari and Francisco (2010) as well as Le (2004), we find no significant relationship between 
our political stability and absence of violence and private investment.  We also do not find significant influence 
of voice and accountability  
The estimation result indicates that control variables (namely real GDP, real interest rate, trade 
openness as well as domestic credit) are significant and supports the existing literature. Trade openness is 
positive and significant which is consistent with Adel (2015) who found that trade openness stimulates growth of 
private investment in an economy. GDP has positive and significant impact on private investment as expected. 
Increasing output growth rate boosts investment which supports Ronge and Kimuyu (1997) as well as King’wara 
(2014).  
Domestic credit to private sector shows a negative and significant impact on private investment 
contrary to our theoretical expectations and Ferreira et al. (2013). This indicates that funds borrowed by the 
private sector do not necessary translate to new or expanding business but rather may be diverted to private 
consumption.  
  
4. Conclusion  
The main objective of this study was to analyze the effects of institutions on private investment in East Africa. 
The study employed panel data covering the period 1996-2015 for four EAC economies. Data on private 
investment (endogenous variable) and trade openness, inflation rate, real GDP, real interest rates, as well as 
domestic credit were obtained from World Development Indicators (WDI). The study finds that government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, control of corruption, and rule of law influence the level of private investments 
in East Africa. We can therefore conclude that the quality of institution play critical role in determining the 
growth of private investment. However, political stability and voice and accountability have no significant effect 
on private investment. These findings have therefore responded to the primary aims and objective of our study 
and made a contribution to the existing literature. 
This findings have numeruous policy implications. Prompt resolutions of disputes may in turn reduce 
litigation cost. Moreover, the ability of governments to control the levels of corruption is crucial for private 
sector development. Improvement in the quality of regulations reduces the complexity and cost of regulatory 
processes paving way for new entrant in a market. Government effectiveness in ensuring an independent 
bureaucracy free from political interference enhances private investment growth as well. Future research may be 
carried at the country level in order to draw country-specific policy prescriptions. 
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